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Abstract. In this chapter, we examine how some of the main results in international trade theory
fare when we abandon the traditional assumption of third-party enforcement of property rights.
Without such enforcement, countries arm and exercise power to secure resources used in production
or to secure the output from that production. Because arming is endogenous and takes scarce
resources to produce, the production of nal goods is also endogenous. Consequently, prices in
either domestic or international markets reect not only preferences, endowments or technologies of
production as predicted by traditional models, but also arming and the power that comes from that.
As we show in the context of a Ricardian model, those countries that produce the most socially
valued goods tend to arm less, giving them a "comparative disadvantage" in power. Accordingly,
the level of welfare obtained by these countries could be lower than that obtained in a competitive
economy with perfect security. In the context of a Heckscher-Ohlin model, we nd that free trade
need not be preferred to autarky, as the costs of conict or self-enforcement swamp the familiar gains
from trade for a certain range of world prices. Finally, trade in the shadow of power can distort
comparative advantage.
JEL Classication: D30, D70, D72, D74, F2, F10.
Keywords: trade openness, property rights, interstate disputes, conict.
yWritten for inclusion in the Oxford Handbook of the Economics of Peace and Conict. The authors
thank Ernesto Dal Bo and Francisco Gonzalez for helpful comments.1 Introduction
At least since Ricardo (1817), international trade theory has followed the traditional ap-
proach in economics of assuming that property rights on all goods and services are perfectly
dened and costlessly enforced. Especially in the international context, however, where
there is no overall authority as there is within individual states to either dene or enforce
property rights, this assumption is empirically untenable; and, as we argue in this chapter,
the empirical failure of this assumption is not without consequences for theory. In particu-
lar, reasonable models that relax the assumption of perfect and costless enforcement yield
dierent predictions and, in some cases, these predictions dier sharply from those obtained
by traditional trade theory.
The absence of third-party enforcement implies the expenditure of signicant resources
by individual states in an eort to enforce property rights themselves. Military expenditures,
representing one visible aspect of this costly self-enforcement, is nearly 2.5 percent of world
GDP (SIPRI, 2008). Of course, states, organizations, and individuals incur other security
and intelligence costs in the self-enforcement of property rights; although these costs are
more dicult to estimate, they also contribute to changing the results of traditional models.
Ultimately, we argue that power matters for trade as critically as the traditional deter-
minants of endowments, preferences, and technology. The type of power that we explore
in this chapter is the one that is based on the use, or the threatened use, of violence that,
in turn, depends on the military capabilities of states.
Trade has taken place in the shadow of power for all almost all of recorded human
history. Each party faces not only the risk that the other party will fail to agree on a price;
in addition, given the opportunity that comes with the threat|or exercise|of violence, each
party faces the risk that the other party will take everything from him. Therefore, both
sides in a trade under anarchy have to be prepared for the possibility of violence. Indeed,
the history of Eurasia over the past millennium is full of examples of the dilemma of trade in
the shadow of power.1 As one Governor-General of the Dutch East India Company stated
to the directors of his company upon taking oce, \we cannot make war without trade nor
trade without war" (Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007, p. 178). Similarly, the British Governor
of Bombay Charles Boone commented in the eighteenth century: \If no Naval Force, no
Trade" (Chaudhuri, 1985, p. 3). All other European powers in early modern times|the
Spaniards, the Portuguese, the French, and the Russians|sought trade with the sword in
hand and the cannon in support. Earlier, the Vikings, the Genoans, and the Venetians had
also built their wealth on the twin enablers of trade and military might.
Trade in the shadow of power did not disappear with the industrial revolution and
1See Findlay and O'Rourke (2007 and this volume).
1the rise of the modern nation-state. Indeed, one might argue that the British Industrial
Revolution itself was underwritten by the British navy and the long-distance trade of the
Empire. Furthermore, it is beyond dispute that the rst modern era of globalization that
preceded World War I was accompanied by an arms race among the Great Powers. And,
it is dicult to deny the notion, even if rarely admitted among polite company or within
much of economics, that in practice international trade today is taking place in the shadow
of power.
Precisely how the shadow of power matters in trade depends on the particular setting.
Our aim in this chapter is to examine how some of the main results in international trade
theory fare when we allow for the exercise of power. We do this in the context of simplied
versions of the 2-good, 2-country, Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin trade models, augmenting
each with a nontraded good|namely \guns." In the augmented Ricardian model, guns are
used to capture some of the traded goods, whereas in the augmented Heckscher-Ohlin model
guns are used to capture a contested resource, like oil.
In both models, the production of goods that are eventually traded depends not only on
the endowments, technologies and preferences of the countries that are engaged in trade.
It also depends on arming the takes scarce resources to produce. Consequently, prices in
either domestic or international markets reect arming and the power that comes from
that, in addition to preferences, endowments or technologies of production. Of course,
arming is itself endogenous. And, as we show in the Ricardian context, those who hold the
most socially valued goods need not have the advantage they would enjoy in a competitive
economy with perfect security. For producing a good that is highly valued can induce a
country to arm less and thus give them a \comparative disadvantage" in power.
In the Heckscher-Ohlin context, we examine the interaction of two small countries that
compete for a resource and compare the outcomes when both countries are autarkic and
when both countries engage in free trade, taking world prices as given. Arming under
autarky and arming under free trade are typically not related, and we nd that there exists
a range of world prices under which both countries prefer autarky to free trade, despite the
fact that both countries are small and thus have no eect on world prices. In particular,
for this range of world prices, the gains from trade are swamped by the extra cost of arming
under free trade. Moreover, for some range of prices, a country exports a dierent good
when there are power considerations than when there are not as in the strictly neoclassical
special case; thus, trade in the shadow of power can distort comparative advantage.
22 A Model with Insecure Outputs
Consider two countries, E (for England) and S (for Spain), having initial resources, RE and
RS, respectively, and each one specializing in the production of a nal good, cloth (c) and
wine (w), respectively. Due to insecurity, both countries produce an additional good that
we can call \guns."2 Letting gE and gS denote the amount of guns produced respectively
by E and S, the production of nal goods c and w are the following:
c = RE   gE and w = RS   gS: (1)
Both countries have the same Cobb-Douglas utility function dened over the consumption
of these two nal goods, ci and wi:
U(ci;wi) = c
i w1 
i ; i = E;S; (2)
where  2 (0;1).
We suppose that the two countries rst produce their guns. This choice, by equation
(1), determines the output of cloth and wine. Each country then attempts to seize some of
the other's output.3 Such a setting captures, for example, the interactions between Britain
and Spain and between Britain and France in the Atlantic Ocean during the 17th and 18th
centuries, when the navies and privateers of each of those countries captured merchants'
ships and the cargo of one another.4 How much each country seizes of the other's output
and how much it defends of its own output depend on two factors: (i) the general level of
insecurity and (ii) the amount of guns that the two countries possess.
Let  2 [0;1] denote the degree of security|that is, the fraction of each country's output
that is not vulnerable to seizure by the other country. The remaining fraction of output,
1   , is subject to seizure, and divided among the two countries in shares that depend on
the amount of guns in the two countries' possession. In particular, let q(gE;gS) be country
2We suppose throughout this section that, despite the problems created by insecurity, under free trade
it does not \pay" for E to produce wine, nor for S to produce cloth. Specically, we assume the technology
for the good that each country has a comparative disadvantage in is extremely inecient, so that we can
essentially view the initial endowment RE as being useful to produce only cloth and guns and the initial
endowment RS as being useful to produce only wine and guns. We note that this \augmented Ricardian"
model coincides with the Armington model (Armington, 1969), in assuming that inputs (i.e., resource
endowments) and thus outputs are nationally dierentiated. Given our Cobb-Douglas specication for
utility made below in equation (2), the model is a special case in which the elasticity of substitution equals
1.
3Alternatively, the conict between the two countries could be thought of as being driven by insecurity
of intermediate goods. For this interpretation, equation (2) would be viewed as a production function, with
ci and wi as intermediate goods; in this case,  and 1    could be thought of as cost shares or elasticities
of output.
4See Leeson (2009) for an overview of the historical evidence on privateers and Findlay and O'Rourke
(2007) for many other examples.
3E's share and 1   q(gE;gS) be country S's share. The function q(gE;gS) is assumed to
be dierentiable, strictly increasing in gE and strictly decreasing in gS, and have other










i=E;S gi = 0:
(3)
The secure output of each country, c for E and w for S, is traded competitively
by the large number of traders in each country. Of course, given the the Cobb-Douglas
specication for utility (2), the competitive equilibrium allocations, the relative price of c
to w, and the equilibrium payo to each country would be the same if all output|secure
as well as insecure|were traded competitively.
The sequence of events in the interaction between the two countries is as follows:
Stage 1. Arming levels gE and gS are chosen simultaneously. Given those choices, the
outputs of c and w are determined by (1).
Stage 2. Arming levels determine how the insecure outputs of each country are divided.
Country E keeps a  + (1   )q(gE;gS)) share of c and obtains a (1   )q(gE;gS)
share of w, whereas country S obtains a (1   )[1   q(gE;gS)] share of c and keeps a
 + (1   )[1   q(gE;gS)] share of w:
Stage 3. The secure shares of c and w (or, equivalently, all shares of c and w) are traded
competitively.
More formally, we dene the outcome of stage 3 as follows:




S) and a relative price
of c in terms of w, p; such that:
(i) For i = E;S; (c
i;w
i) maximizes (2) subject to pci + wi = mi(p), where
mE(p) = p[ + (1   )q(gE;gS)]c + (1   )q(gE;gS)w




S = c and w
E; + w
S = w.
The rst condition requires that each country choose its consumption to maximize utility
subject to its budget constraint, with both expenditures and budget constraints evaluated
at the competitive equilibrium price. The second condition requires that the markets for
both goods clear.
4Solving the model backwards starting with the third stage, it can be shown that, for any
given choice of guns, the equilibrium relative price of c (i.e., the relative price that clears












Note that this price depends not only on preferences (represented in this simple case by the
parameter ) and endowments (RE and RS), but also on the amount of arming chosen by
the two countries. An exogenous increase in arming by country E increases the scarcity and
the relative price of the nal good it produces, c; by the same token, an increase in arming
by country S increases the scarcity and the relative price of its produced nal good, w:
The equilibrium price in (4), by denition, takes as the initial allocation the distribution
of c and w across the two countries after each country has captured some of the other
country's output|i.e., following stage 2 of the game. If, however, we were to consider as
the \initial" allocations those after arming levels have been chosen in the rst stage (1) and
compare them to the nal competitive equilibrium allocations, the implicit exchange ratio
would generally dier from the price shown in (4). In particular, one can easily verify, using
the denition of a competitive equilibrium above and equation (4), that country E's and












= (1   ) + (1   )(1   q(gE;gS)): (5b)
Thus, starting with initial endowments after arming choices have been made in stage 1,
where country E owns all of its output of cloth, c = RE   gE, and country S owns all of
its output of wine, w = RS   gS, the nal allocations are as if E exchanged a (1   ) +
(1   )(1   q(gE;gS)) fraction of its c for a  + (1   )q(gE;gS) fraction of country S's
w. In fact, such an exchange that could be supported by each country's arming can be
an alternative interpretation of the model. The resulting implicit or eective price of c in
terms of w then is the following:
 p =
 + (1   )q(gE;gS)




This price diers from p in (4) as two additional factors play a role in its determination:
the degree of security, , and the appropriative shares, q(gE;gS) and 1   q(gE;gS).5 A
5The dierence between these two prices could be visualized within an Edgeworth box, depicting three
points corresponding to the three stages: the nal (stage 3) allocation, the initial (stage 1) allocation, and
the interim (stage 2) allocation. The slope of the line connecting the interim (stage 2) allocation and the
5higher degree of security  implies that, other things being equal,  p is closer to p. (The
two prices are equal only when there is perfect security,  = 1.) The lower is the degree of
security , the more prominent is the role played by the appropriative shares, q(gE;gS) and
1   q(gE;gS). Indeed, arming inuences the eective price  p not only through its eect on
output, RE   gE and RS   gS, but also through its inuence on these shares. Specically,
for country E, an increase in its arming increases its own share q(gE;gS), decreases the
share of country S 1 q(gE;gS), and reduces its nal output c(= RE  gE). All these three
eects of an increase in country E's arming increase  p. Similarly, an increase in country S's
arming reduces the eective price  p. Thus, an increase in arming by one country (either E
or S) unambiguously improves that country's terms of trade.
Of course, the choice of guns is endogenous, determined as a Nash equilibrium of the
game described above. The relevant payo functions for the two countries, given stages 2
and 3 where we take into account the competitive equilibrium (5) that is induced for any
choice of guns in the rst stage, can be shown to be the following:
VE(gE;gS) = [ + (1   )q(gE;gS)](RE   gE)(RS   gS)1  (7a)
VS(gE;gS) = [(1   ) + (1   )(1   q(gE;gS))](RE   gE)(RS   gS)1 : (7b)
Given that both countries have the same linearly homogeneous utility function (2), for any
given choice of guns there is a total \surplus" (or transferable utility) that is divided among
the two countries. It equals (RE   gE)(RS   gS)1 . The payo functions in (7) indicate
that each country's share of the surplus is a convex combination of the competitive and
appropriative shares, with the weights determined by the security parameter . The larger
is that security parameter, the more important are the competitive shares,  and 1   
respectively for countries E and S, and the less important are the appropriative shares,
q(gE;gS) and 1 q(gE;gS) respectively for countries E and S, in determining the countries'
shares of the surplus.
It is instructive to rst examine the two limiting cases of perfect security ( = 1)
and perfect insecurity ( = 0): We then turn to the intermediate case of partial security
( 2 (0;1)).
nal allocation represents p
, while the slope of the line connecting the initial (stage 1) allocation and the
nal allocation represents  p.
62.1 Perfect security ( = 1) as a benchmark
In the hypothetical case of perfect security, the payo functions are those given in (7) with
 = 1:
VE(gE;gS) = (RE   gE)(RS   gS)1  (8a)
VS(gE;gS) = (1   )(RE   gE)(RS   gS)1 : (8b)
Since arming is costly and provides no benet in this case, neither country has an incentive
to arm: g1
E = g1
S = 0, where the superscript 1 signies that  = 1. As such, the equilibrium
allocations, prices, and utilities are the same as those that would obtain under competitive
conditions in an economy with perfectly and costlessly enforced property rights. In partic-
ular, the equilibrium consumption levels, price, and payos are respectively the following:
c1
E = RE and c1
S = (1   )RE;
w1
E = RS and w1
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The preference parameter  and the endowments RE and RS have the expected eects on
equilibrium values. An increase, for example, in the relative value of the good produced
by E (i.e., an increase in ) implies an advantage for that country in competitive trade.
Furthermore, an increase in either country's initial endowment (RE or RS) increases the
consumption (of c or w, respectively) of both countries and thus their payos.
2.2 Perfect insecurity ( = 0)
Under perfect or complete insecurity, the payo functions in (7) become:
VE(gE;gS) = q(gE;gS)(RE   gE)(RS   gS)1  (10a)
VS(gE;gS) = (1   q(gE;gS))(RE   gE)(RS   gS)1 : (10b)
Our objective here is to characterize the unique interior Nash equilibrium (g0
E;g0
S), which is
known to exist.6 The equilibrium satises simultaneously the following rst-order-conditions:
6The proofs can be found in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997), who analyze the more general case where
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  (1   )(1   q0)(RE   g0
E)(RS   g0
S)  = 0; (11b)
where q0 = q(g0
E;g0
S).
The rst term of each derivative represents the marginal benet of a small increase
in a country's own arming, and it equals the resulting small change in the share received
times the size of the \surplus" that is contestable by the two countries. The second term of
each derivative represents the marginal cost of a small increase in a country's own arming.
That marginal cost equals the marginal utility of a country's own output (which is cloth
for E and wine for S) times that country's appropriative share. Thus, other things being
equal, a relatively greater valuation of one country's output (for example, c, if  > 1
2 so
that 1    < 1
2) would give, as noted above, an advantage to that country in the case
of perfect security (see equation (9)), but would result in a disadvantage for that country
under perfect insecurity.










S) = (1   )(1   q0): (12b)









(1   )(RE   g0
E)
: (13)
Note that if q(gE;gS) is symmetrically dened in its two arguments, and is a concave









@gS holds if and only if g0
E > g0
S holds. It follows, then, that the left hand
side (LHS) of (13) is less than 1 if and only if g0
E > g0
S: Now consider the case where
RE = RS and suppose, without loss of generality, that g0
E > g0
S: Since the LHS of (13) is





which is possible only if  < 1
2 < 1   , or cloth is relatively less valuable than wine. In
8other words, provided RE = RS; country E is more powerful than country S and receives
a greater share of the total surplus if and only if the good that it produces, cloth, is less
valuable relative to the good that country S produces. This result, which stands in sharp
contrast to what would occur under perfect competition and perfect security as shown in (9),
emerges because the production of a good that is relatively more valuable in consumption
implies a greater opportunity cost in arming, to put the country producing that good at a
relative disadvantage in the conict. It is worth noting that this result remains intact for
fairly general specications of q(gE;gS) (i.e., other than that shown in (3)) and of utility
functions (see Skaperdas, 1992; Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997).
More generally, and for any combination of initial resources RE and RS, an increase in
the relative preference for cloth  decreases the equilibrium level of arming by country E,
increases that by country S, and therefore unambiguously reduces E's equilibrium share
and increases that of country S (see Proposition 3 in Skaperdas and Syropoulos, 1997; and
the Appendix to this chapter). We summarize the main comparative static results of this
subsection in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Suppose there is perfect insecurity ( = 0).
(i) Let RE = RS: Then, the following conditions are equivalent: (a)  < 1   ; (b)
g0
E > g0
S; and, (c) q0 > 1=2:
(ii) For any combination of RE and RS, an increase in  induces a reduction in g0
E and
an increase in g0
S; and therefore a reduction in q0:
Thus, an exogenous increase in the intrinsic valuation of a good that a country specializes
in reduces the country's arming, power, and share of the total surplus that it receives in
equilibrium. This nding might sound extreme, but note that the conditions under which
it holds are extreme as well. That is, there is perfect insecurity and the terms of trade
are solely determined by the relative amounts of arming. However, the result is indicative
of the overall role that higher relative valuations and scarcity for some goods can play in
determining their producer's welfare, as shown in the next subsection that considers a less
extreme case.
2.3 Partial security (0 <  < 1)
The relevant payo functions in the intermediate case of imperfect (or partial) security
are the general ones in (7). The Nash equilibrium (g
E;g
S) can be derived from conditions
analogous to (12). In particular, the equilibrium conditions imply (where an \" indicates










S) = (1   )[(1   ) + (1   )(1   q)]: (14b)
As in the case of perfect insecurity in (12), the LHS of each equation is proportional to the
marginal benet of arming and the right hand side (RHS) of each equation is proportional
to the marginal cost of arming. Each LHS of (14) equals that of (12) multiplied by 1 , the
degree of insecurity. Not surprisingly, the marginal benet of arming is lower the greater
is security. Each RHS of (14) diers from that in (12) only in that q0 is replaced by
+(1 )q for E and 1 q0 is replaced by (1 )+(1 )(1 q) for S: Given that
 is a determinant of the marginal cost of arming for E and 1    is a determinant of the
marginal cost of arming for S, the preferences parameter  plays a similar role that it plays
in the case of perfect insecurity.
In fact, we can show, based on a similar line of reasoning similar used above to analyze
(13), that when RE = RS; g
E > g
S if and only if  < 1   . Thus, as in the case with
perfect insecurity when RE = RS; other things being equal, the country that specializes
in the production of the good that is valued by less also arms more than its adversary
and receives a greater share of the insecure output. However, the total share of each nal
good received by this country need not be greater than the total share received the other
country that tends to arm less. For the nal shares are determined both by guns and by the
competitive share ( for E and 1  for S). A larger  implies a greater share for England
that comes from the secure part of its endowment but it also implies a smaller share that
comes from the insecure part. Which eect dominates obviously depends on the level of
security .
As in the case of complete insecurity, for any combination of endowments RE and RS,
an increase in  reduces the level of arming for country E relative to that of country S,
and therefore reduces q: More importantly, a reduction in the level of security, ; increases
arming by both countries. The following proposition, shown in the Appendix, summarizes
these ndings:
Proposition 2. Suppose there is partial security ( 2 (0;1)).
(i) Let RE = RS: Then, the following conditions are equivalent: (a)  < 1   ; (b)
g
E > g
S; and, (c) q > 1=2:
(ii) For any combination of RE and RS, an increase in  induces a reduction in g
E relative
to g
S; and therefore a reduction in q:




It is worth noting that for a suciently low level of security, or small , an increase in 
implies a lower g
E and a higher g
S, consistent with the result of Proposition 1(ii), which
focuses on the case of complete insecurity. For higher levels of security, however, the eects
of an increase in  on equilibrium arming by the two countries is ambiguous. Nevertheless,
regardless of the level of security ( 2 [0;1)), an increase in the social value of the good
in which one country specializes reduces that country's comparative advantage in conict
over insecure output.
Finally, we consider some of the welfare implications of insecurity. As a starting point,
consider the benchmark case where the two countries have identical resource endowments
(i.e., RE = RS) and consumers in both countries value wine and cloth equally (i.e.,  = 1
2).
Since in the presence of insecurity the two countries produce positive and equal quantities
of guns|and thus share the surplus equally|both must nd the equilibrium under perfect
security, where no guns are produced, more appealing. In other words, in this benchmark
case where the two countries are identical and the two goods are equally valued, conict has
the features of a prisoner's dilemma. Moreover, because under partial insecurity an increase
in the degree of security () induces both countries to produce less arms (Proposition 2(iii)),
each country's welfare must be monotonically increasing in .
These ndings, however, need not remain intact when we allow for asymmetries: RE 6=
RS and  6= 1
2. Even when RE = RS, country E for example prefers conict as long
as  is suciently small. For in this case, as noted earlier, while a smaller  implies a
smaller share of the total surplus for country E that comes from the secure part of its
endowment, it also implies a larger share that comes from the insecure part. Given some
degree of insecurity ( 2 [0;1)), if  is suciently small, the latter eect dominates such
that country E receives a greater total share of the surplus, and these gains to E swamp the
increased costs of arming reected in a smaller total surplus, relative to the case of complete
security.7 By the same token, if  is suciently large, country S will prefer some degree of
insecurity  2 [0;1) to none at all. The logic follows more generally when RE 6= RS. Not
surprisingly, then, an increase in security need not be welfare-improving for country E if
 is suciently small or for country S if  is suciently large. The following proposition
summarizes these results, which are shown in the Appendix:
Proposition 3. For any combination of RE and RS,
(i) country i = E (i = S) will prefer some conict to none if  is suciently small (large);
7Indeed, in the case of partial security ( 2 [0;1)), country E's share of the total surplus and thus its
welfare is strictly positive as  approaches to zero; by contrast, in the case of complete security ( = 1), E's
share of the surplus vanishes and thus its welfare approaches zero.
11and
(ii) if  is suciently small (large) then the welfare of country i = E (i = S) need not be
monotonically increasing in the degree of security .
For most of human history, long-distance trade has been taking place in the face of
high insecurity. Both the level of insecurity and the attempts by each country to mitigate
the level of insecurity, primarily through arming, can only have economic consequences in
ways not predicted by traditional models. Production of goods is endogenous to arming
decisions, and preferences have unexpected and seemingly perverse eects on what each
country receives in the end. Market prices or shadow prices reect not only the eect of
arming to divert endowments away from the production of nal consumption goods, but
also the inuence of arming along with insecurity in the determination of how much each
side receives.8
Of course, given the structure of this model consisting of only two countries, one might
naturally attribute the distortions induced by conict to terms of trade eects. However, as
shown in the next section, the distortionary inuence of conict on equilibrium outcomes
does not hinge on such eects.
3 A Model with Insecure Resources
Whereas the model of the previous section can be considered Ricardian in its emphasis on
dierences in technologies across countries, in this section we turn to a model that is an
outgrowth of the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade that assumes identical technologies. One
other dierence is that, in the model of this section insecurity is conned to one input.
Furthermore, whereas the model of the last section considered two \large" countries, the
model of this section consists of two \small" countries; their arming decisions inuence
autarkic prices, but not world prices.
The model is that found in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (2001) and is a special case of
Garnkel et al. (2010). Consider two countries, with each country i = E;S possessing
8One might view the model of this section as having no relevance to the modern world; however, the
following statement by former President of Germany Koehler suggests otherwise:
\A country of our size, with its focus on exports and thus reliance on foreign trade, must
be aware that military deployments are necessary in an emergency to protect our interests,
for example, when it comes to trade routes, for example, when it comes to preventing regional
instabilities that could negatively inuence our trade, jobs and incomes." Horst K ohler, former
President of Germany (NY Times, May 31, 2010)
It is interesting to add that, almost immediately after having made this statement, former President Koehler
felt compelled to resign, not because the statement is untrue, but probably because of its bluntness. The
apparent taboo in politics of even uttering statements like that quoted above might have its counterpart
within economics, making research and models that allow for the interdependence of security and trade
policies rare.
12Ti units of secure land and Li units of secure labor. There are, in addition, T0 units of
insecure land that the two countries contest. Land is valuable because it contains oil (or
water, minerals, and any other valuable resource). One unit of land produces one unit of oil,
and there is no alternative use. In contrast, labor can be used to produce on a one-to-one
basis guns and/or butter. Then, letting gi denote the quantity of guns under country i's
control, the maximal production of butter in country i is Li   gi.
As in the previous section, consumers in both countries have preferences dened over




where  2 (0;1) and Oi and Bi are the aggregate quantities of oil and butter respectively
consumed in country i = E;S.
Arming determines the division of the disputed land T0 (and the associated quantity of
oil) between the two countries. Following the strategy of the previous section, we suppose
that the share going to each country i, q(gE;gS) for i = E and 1   q(gE;gS) for i = S,
depends on the arming by both countries. But, here we use the particular specication in
(3). Thus, we write the share going to country i = E;S as qi =
gi
gE+gS.
The stages of interactions between the two countries are also analogous to those in the
previous section:
Stage 1. Arming levels gE and gS are chosen simultaneously. These choices determine
the production of butter in the two countries (i.e., Bi = Li   gi) .
Stage 2. Arming levels also determine how the insecure land is distributed. Country E
ends up with total endowment of land that equals TE + qET0 and country S ends up
with an endowment of TS+qST0. Those endowments of land also equal the production
of oil in each country.
Stage 3. Butter and oil are traded competitively either (i) domestically within each coun-
try under autarky or (ii) internationally with each country taking world prices as
given.
Let pi denote the price of oil (and land) in country i relative to butter (as well as relative
to guns and labor). Then, for any given choice of guns, the value of country i's income or
revenue is
Ri = pi(Ti + qiT0) + (Li   gi); i = E;S: (16)
Note that a larger level of arming chosen by one country, gi given gj for j 6= i, has two
13opposing eects on that country's income. It raises the country's income Ri because it
increases the country's share of the contested oil T0, but also reduces the country's income
because less labor is available for the production of butter.
Solving the consumer's problem of maximizing the utility function in (15) subject to
the budget constraint that the country's aggregate expenditure is equal to the value of its
income in (16) yields the following indirect utility functions:
Vi = p 
i Ri = p 
i [pi(Ti + qiT0) + (Li   gi)]; (17)
where   (1   )1  for i = E;S: The term p 
i represents the marginal utility of
income for country i = E;S. As one can verify, country i's demand and supply of oil, given
the countries' arming choices and the outcome of the conict, are respectively Ri=pi and





  [Ti + qiT0]; (18)
which is positive when the country imports oil and negative when the country exports oil.
The eect of arming on a country's welfare need not be conned to its eect on income.
In addition, particularly in the case of autarky, arming can inuence welfare through its
eect on prices. We next explore the implications for arming and welfare for the two
countries under autarky and under completely free trade with both countries being small
in world markets and therefore taking the world price of oil as given. To simplify, let Li = L
for both i = E;S. Furthermore, let T denote the whole supply of land and let Ti = 
2T for
both i = E;S, where  denotes the fraction of all land that is secure and non-contested. It
then follows that T0 = (1   )T:
3.1 Autarky
In the case of autarky, individuals in each country consume only the quantities that are
produced domestically. Letting superscript A identify variables in an autarkic equilibrium,
this restriction implies that MA
i = 0 for i = E;S. Then, from (18) with (16), one can
easily verify that, for any given choices of arming by the two countries, the market clearing















2 + qi(1   )]
#
; i = E;S: (19)
14Despite the absence of international trade, this expression is analogous to the price in (4),
with preferences (as reected in the parameter ) and relative endowments of labor and land
determining the price. Here, an exogenous change in a country's arms has an unambiguous
eect on the autarkic price. Specically, an increase in country i's gun production reduces
the domestic supply of butter and, as a result of the increased share of contested land,
increases the domestic supply of oil; thus, an increase in country i's gun production reduces
the autarkic price.
By substituting (19) into (17) or, equivalently, by simply substituting the country's
endowments after arming into the utility function (15), we obtain the relevant payo func-
tion for each country (at the beginning of stage 1). It can be shown that each country's
optimizing choice of guns (gA
E;gA
S) in an autarkic equilibrium satises
pA




  1 = 0; i = E;S: (20)
The rst term represents the marginal benet of guns and equals the value of the additional
land (or oil) obtained by increasing arms by one unit. The second term consists only of
the price of guns.9 Using (19) and (20) with (3), we nd that the Nash equilibrium is
symmetric, with both countries choosing the following level of arming:
gA = 1
4pA(1   )T =
(1   )
2(1   ) + (1   )
L: (21)
As shown in this solution, arming under autarky is proportional to labor L, increasing in
the relative importance of oil in consumption (), and increasing in the proportion of land
that is insecure (1   ): By substituting (21) in (19) we obtain the equilibrium autarkic








2(1   ) + (1   )

: (22)
Note that the term inside the brackets in (22) is maximized at 1 when security problems
are absent ( = 1). Hence, some insecurity ( < 1) drives a wedge between the resulting
equilibrium price pA and that which would emerge in the hypothetical case of perfect security
(denoted by pA1). This wedge, which implies that pA < pA1, arises as insecurity induces
the countries to arm, thereby diverting labor resources away from the production of butter.
The greater is the degree of insecurity (i.e., the smaller is ), the greater is the wedge, and
thus the lower is pA relative to pA1.
9As suggested by the earlier discussion, each country's choice of arms inuences its own autarkic price.
However, the eect of this inuence on the optimizing choice of guns vanishes due to the equilibrium
requirement that the excess demand for oil be equal to zero under autarky (i.e., M
A
i = 0 for i = E;S).
15This same bracketed term also appears in the equilibrium payo for each country:
V A
i = V A =

2(1   )
2(1   ) + (1   )
1 
(T=2)L1  i = E;S: (23)
Thus, equilibrium payos under autarky are decreasing in the level of insecurity as well.
We summarize the equilibrium outcome under autarky in the following:
Proposition 4. Under Autarky where the two contending countries are identical,
(i) the equilibrium domestic price (pA) is strictly increasing in the degree of security 
and, therefore, is lower than the domestic autarkic price that obtains when security
is perfect (pA1); and,
(ii) equilibrium welfare (V A) is strictly increasing in the degree of security  and, there-
fore, is lower than the level of welfare that obtains when security is perfect (V A1).
3.2 Free trade
Suppose now that in stage 3 both countries participate in the world market with oil and
butter traded freely at a relative price p for oil. Since the two countries are small, they
take this world price as given. Country i's payo function V F
i (gE;gS) under trade can be
obtained from (17) by replacing pi with p. With these payos, we can now determine the
two countries' equilibrium arming levels, denoted by (gF
E;gF
S ). The equilibrium conditions





  1 = 0; i = E;S: (24)
Nevertheless, because p is now exogenous, whereas the price in the case of autarky was
endogenous to arming, the resulting equilibrium does not have to be similar to the one
under autarky. Under free trade as in the case of autarky, the marginal cost of guns is
identical for the two countries; however, in the case of free trade, an important component
of the marginal benet of guns|namely, the price of oil and land|is also identical for the
two countries. These two forces work together to \level the playing eld," as they equalize
arming across the two countries.10
Specically, assuming that the labor constraint is not binding for either economy (i.e.,
gi < L), the Nash equilibrium choices of guns for the two countries under free trade are
10This eect emerges under free trade even when the secure endowments of land (Ti) and labor (Li) are
asymmetrically distributed across the two countries; by contrast, the symmetric equilibrium emerges under
autarky only if the countries have identical secure land and labor endowments. Garnkel et al. (2010) show
under more general production structures, where both land and labor are used to produce both consumption
goods and arms, and under a more general specication for utility that free trade induces a greater tendency
for arms equalization than does autarky.
16identical and equal to the following:
gF = 1
4p(1   )T; i = E;S: (25)
This level of arming under free trade is proportional to size and price of the contested
land, in contrast to the level of arming under autarky, which is proportional to the labor
endowment. Of course, when the world price of oil and the size of the contested resource|
which also depends on the degree of security|are suciently large, the labor constraint is
binding. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption that the labor constraint is non-binding
so that L > 1
4p(1   )T: Then, the equilibrium payos under free trade are:
V F
i (p) = V F(p) = p   1
4pT(1 + ) + L

i = E;S: (26)
Clearly, this equilibrium payo, like that under autarky, is strictly increasing in the degree
of security .
When all factors and goods are perfectly secure, welfare is a strictly quasi-convex func-
tion of the world price p, attaining its minimum at the autarkic price, p = pA1. Hence, under
perfect security, trade at any world price other than the autarkic price implies an increase in
welfare, reecting the familiar gains from trade. In the presence of insecurity, however, the
endogeneity of arming implies that factor endowments available for the production of goods
that can be traded are also endogenous; and, in general, welfare need not be minimized at









Given some degree of insecurity (i.e., any  < 1), this critical price is strictly greater than
the autarkic price pA shown in (22). The importance of this point will become apparent
shortly when we compare the welfare levels that countries attain under autarky and trade,
to which we turn in the next subsection. First, we summarize the main ndings of this
subsection.
Proposition 5. Under Free Trade where the two contending countries are identical,
(i) the welfare minimizing world price (pmin) is strictly decreasing in the degree of security
 and is strictly greater than the equilibrium domestic autarkic price (pA); and
(ii) equilibrium welfare (V F) is strictly increasing in the degree of security  and, there-
fore, is lower than the level of welfare that obtains when security is perfect (V F1).
But, before turning to our comparison of the outcomes under the two trade regimes, we
consider one more implication of conict for free trade|namely, comparative advantage.
17Combining equation (18) with the conict technology (3), the expression for income (16)
under the assumption that the two countries have identical secure resource endowments and
the solution for arming (25), we can write country i's net imports of oil as
MF
i =  1
4T[2(1   ) + (1   )] +

p
L i = E;S: (28)
One can easily verify from this expression that the two countries will be net exporters of
oil when p > pA where pA is as shown in (22), and net importers otherwise. Using equation




2T(1   ) +

p
L i = E;S: (29)
In this case, the two countries will be net exporters of oil when p > pA1 where pA1 is as
shown in (22) with  = 1, and net importers otherwise. But, as established in Proposition
4(i), the autarkic price with some degree of insecurity is strictly less than the autarkic price
under perfect security: pA < pA1. Thus, there exists a range of world prices, p 2 (pA;pA1),
under which the contending countries export oil, but would be importing oil if resources
were perfectly secure.11 Thus, the shadow of power can distort the countries' apparent
comparative advantage. But, also note from (28) that, for any given world price, the
greater is the degree of insecurity (i.e., the lower is ), the smaller is the country's net
imports of oil. As such, the shadow of power more generally distorts trade ows.
3.3 Comparing autarky with free trade
Given our characterization above of the equilibrium outcomes under autarky and free trade,
we now turn to compare them in terms of arming and welfare. We start with the level
of arming. As shown earlier, the level of arming under autarky (21) depends only on
endowments and the other parameters of the model. By contrast, the level of arming under
free trade (25) depends critically on the world price and positively so. Then, using (21) and
(25) with the solution for the equilibrium price under autarky (22), one can show that
gF T gA if and only if p T pA: (30)
When the world price of oil is relatively high, land and the oil it contains are relatively
more valuable so as to induce greater arming by both countries. To be more precise, for
world prices above pA implying the countries export oil, their incentive to arm is greater
11See also Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2004 and this volume), as well as Garnkel, et al. (2008), who nd a
similar result in the context of domestic insecurity and free trade.
18than that under autarky; and, for world prices below pA implying that the countries import
oil, their incentive to arm is less than that under autarky.12
We now turn to the welfare comparison under the two trade regimes. As this comparison
reveals, there are two critical forces at work here. First, as noted above in section 3.2, we
have the well known gains from trade that favor trade over autarky. Second, as we have just
seen, trade inuences the countries' incentive to contest the insecure resource; whether this
eect favors trade over autarky depends on whether the world price is less than or greater
than the autarkic price.
To proceed, note rst that the payos under free trade are identical to those under
autarky when the world price equals the autarkic price: V F(pA) = V A. Furthermore, recall
that V F(p) is a strictly quasi-convex function of the world price, reaching its minimum at
pmin. This strict quasi-convexity implies that there exists another price p0 > pmin, uniquely
dened by the condition V F(p0) = V A. Since pmin as shown in (27) is greater than pA
(Proposition 5(i)), there exists a range of world prices under which autarky dominates free
trade for both countries|namely, p 2 (pA;p0)|as illustrated in Figure 1. For world prices
within this range, the payos for both countries under autarky are strictly greater than the
payos they enjoy under free trade; for world prices outside that range, p  pA or p  p0,
the payos for both countries under free trade are at least as high as the payos under
autarky.13 These ndings are summarized in the following proposition:
Proposition 6. When the world price of oil is between pA and p0, welfare under autarky
is higher than welfare under free trade; otherwise, welfare under free trade is higher.
The intuition for these ndings draws on the two key forces noted above: (i) the familiar
gains from trade and (ii) the induced (strategic) eects on arming and the associated costs
of insecurity. When the world price for oil (p) is less than the autarkic price (pA), the
production of guns under trade is lower. In this case, switching from an autarkic regime to
a free trade regime reduces each country's incentive to contest the disputed resource. This
strategic eect represents a benet that reinforces the familiar gains from trade to make
welfare unambiguously higher in a free-trade regime than that under autarky. However,
as the world price of oil rises and approaches pA, the conict between the two nations
intensies and the strategic benet falls, as do the gains from trade. At the autarkic price,
the costs of insecurity are just as large under free trade as they are under autarky, so that
the strategic benet from trade goes to zero along with the gains from trade. Thus, at
12Dal Bo and Dal Bo (2004 and this volume) and Garnkel et al. (2008) yield an analogous nding in a
setting with domestic insecurity.
13One can show further that the range of world prices under which autarky strictly dominates trade is
increasing in the degree of insecurity. The proof is similar to that of an analogous result shown Garnkel et













Figure 1: Welfare comparison
p = pA, welfare under autarky equals welfare under free trade, as shown in Figure 1.
As the world price rises above the autarkic level, the conict between the two countries
intensies further, implying that the strategic eect of trade generates a welfare cost relative
to the outcome under autarky (i.e., a higher burden of guns). Of course, at the same time,
the gains from trade rise above zero. However, these gains are swamped by the higher
burden of guns; thus, as the world price of oil rises above the autarkic price, welfare under
free trade falls below its autarkic level. Yet, as Proposition 6 indicates, when the world
price of oil becomes suciently high (p > p0), the gains from winning the valuable land and
selling the oil in the global marketplace become very large and outweigh the welfare cost of
guns.
4 Concluding Remarks
Throughout most of human history, trade has taken place within insecure environments,
where property rights are not well dened or enforced|in both domestic and international
settings. While the costs borne by states, organizations, and individuals in trying to self-
enforce property rights are substantial, such costs and more generally the shadow of power
have not been formally incorporated into traditional economic thinking.
In this chapter, we have explored the robustness of some of the central results of tradi-
tional trade theory to power considerations between nations. The analysis has shown that
prices depend on arming and more generally power. This dependence implies in the context
of the augmented Ricardian model, contrary to traditional theory where power considera-
tions are ignored, that the country producing the more socially valued good faces a higher
20opportunity cost of arming and thus a comparative disadvantage in power. In the context
of the augmented Heckscher-Ohlin model, this dependence has implications for the appeal
of free trade relative to that of autarky. Indeed, for some range of world prices, autarky will
be dominated by free trade. The analysis has shown further that, depending on the world
price, a country's comparative advantage in the presence of insecurity might be opposite to
that predicted by the traditional theory that abstracts from insecurity.
Key to the analysis of both models is the level of security, represented by |a parameter
that we have treated as exogenous. An obviously important issue is what determines the
level of security. The continual ghting between England and France during the 18th century
took place mostly in the high seas and in their respective colonies. As such, only trade of
goods and resources that did not have to be transported by ship to-and-from the colonies
could be considered secure. The long nineteenth century that ended with the First World
War was relatively peaceful among the European powers. However, most international trade
then was taking place within each European power's sphere of inuence, and thus security
was not necessarily much greater than it had been in the 18th century. To be sure, not
many wars broke out during this period; but, there was considerable arming that accelerated
during the last two decades of that era. The gradual expansion of formal diplomacy, the
marriages and blood relations among European royalty, and perhaps emerging norms of
international conduct served as checks on the insecurity that existed then. After the Second
World War, these emerging norms along with the dismal experience of warfare crystallized
into a number of international organizations and institutions that signicantly increased
perceived security in interstate relations. With the creation of the United Nations and the
collective security norms that developed, it became considerably harder for one country to
attack another, possibly resulting in a lower level of arming than what might have occurred
otherwise. The creation of the Steel and Coal Union that evolved into the current European
Union is another example of the organizations and institutions that dramatically increased
the level of security among some formerly mortal enemies. Whereas France and Germany
were such enemies before World War II, now there is no visible insecurity in any of the
resources and goods traded between them.
The level of security, then, depends on international institutions and norms that prevail
in any particular era. But security can also be expected to depend partly on the actions of
the states themselves vis- a-vis one another. By maintaining embassies, for example, in each
others' capital, states can reduce the chance of accidental wars, and engage in condence-
building measures that increase the perceived security of trade across them. The institution-
building that France and Germany and other European countries undertook after World
War II is an even more obvious example of the endogeneity of the level of security to the
actions of states. The process is not dissimilar to state-building by dierent factions within
21countries as modeled by McBride et al. (2010).
Another type of state action, however, that can be deleterious to the security of any
two given states is the inuence of third parties, usually states that can be considered
great powers. European countries that previously had high levels of contact and security
in their dealings before World War II, suddenly became enemies after the war because
they fell on either side of the divide created by the Cold War. That is not an historically
atypical condition. Before World War II, for example, smaller states in the periphery of the
European Great powers had to choose which Great power with whom to ally, a choice that
automatically implied that they would become enemies with neighbors who chose to ally
with a rival power.
More generally, even without consideration of third party intervention, alliance forma-
tion would seem to matter for security. As surveyed by Bloch (this volume), a number of
scholars have examined the determinants of alliances formation, but have not considered
explicitly the role of trade. We conjecture that dierent trade regimes imply potentially
dierent sets of stable alliances of countries, which is an important topic for future research.
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A Appendix
Proof of proposition 1. Part (i) was established in the text, and part (ii) has been shown
in Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1997). However, we also prove part (ii) below in the proof to
the next proposition, as a special case.
Proof of proposition 2.










S)[ + (1   )q]: (A.1)
Now suppose that g
E > g
S. Then we have the following:
23 q > 1





@gS, when q(gE;gS) is concave (convex) in its rst (second) argument, as is
the case with the Tullock form of the contest success function (3); and,
 RE   g
E < RS   g
S.
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) + (1   )q]: (A.2)










S)[ + (1   )q]: (A.3)
Since  @q=@gS > 0, this expression can hold if and only if
(1   )[(1   ) + (1   )q] > [ + (1   )q] ,
(1   )2 + (1   )(1   )q > 2 + (1   )q ,
(1   2)(1   )q > [2   (1   )2]:
This last inequality is only possible if  < 1
2; otherwise, the LHS would be non-positive and
the RHS would be non-negative, thus negating the strict inequality.
Parts ii and iii. For notational convenience, let Vi  Vi(gE;gS) for i = E;S and  
=(1 ). In what follows, we sometimes omit the equilibrium symbol \" to avoid clutter,
but one should keep in mind that functions are to be evaluated at the Nash equilibrium.

























Using the specication of the CSF shown in (3) and letting  G = gE + gS,14 we can rewrite
14We use this particular specication to keep matters as simple as possible; however, the results hold more
24gE and gS as gE = q  G and gS = (1   q)  G, respectively. Furthermore, the specication in
(3) implies that @q=@gE = (1 q)=  G and @q=@gS =  q=  G. Substituting these relationships
into (A.4a) and (A.4b) yields the following:




RE   q  G
= 0 (A.5a)
q=  G
(1   ) + 1   q
 
1   
RS   (1   q)  G
= 0: (A.5b)
Now solve (A.5a) and (A.5b) for  G and label the resulting solutions  GE and  GS, respectively.
Then, for given factor endowments RE and RS, dene
(q;;)   GE    GS
=
(1   q)RE
q( + 1   q) + 2
 
qRS
(1   q)(1    + q) + (1   )2
: (A.6)
 is continuous in q, limq!0  = RE=(2) > 0, and limq!1  =  RS=[(1 )2] < 0; there-
fore, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a q = q(;) such that (q;;) = 0.





 + 2 + (1   q)2
[q( + 1   q) + 2]2 +
RS

1    + (1   )2 + q2





RE(1   q)(q + 2)
[q( + 1   q) + 2]2 +
RSq [1    + 2(1   )]





[q( + 1   q) + 2]2 +
RS(1   )2q
[(1   q)(1    + q) + (1   )2]2: (A.7c)
Notice that the sign of  is ambiguous, whereas the signs of q and  are both negative.
Moreover, since q < 0, the equilibrium share q is unique.
Now, consider how q responds to an exogenous increase in . By the implicit function
theorem, we have dq=d =  =q. Since  and q are both negative, dq=d < 0
for all  2 (0;1), which establishes part (ii) of the proposition, and suggests that g
E falls
relative to g
S as  rises.
This nding, however, does not necessarily imply that g
E is decreasing or that g
S is
increasing in . Consider the inuence of an exogenous increase in  on g
E, for exam-
ple, noting that  G =  GE, which implies g
E = q  GE. Dierentiation of g
E = q  GE
generally.





























REq(1   q)(q + 2)
[q( + 1   q) + 2]2 +
RE

q2 + (2q   1)







Generally, this expression cannot be signed. However, it is worth considering what happens
in the case of complete insecurity, where  = 0 and thus  = 0 (Proposition 2(ii)). In this









( + 1   q)2 +
RE





















q2( + 1   q)
 
RS(1      q + q2)




q(1    + q)
< 0:
Since  q > 0 and q  1, the sign of the expression in (A.8) equals the sign of , which
is negative as indicated above. Thus, when  = 0, an increase in  implies a decrease in
g
E. Analogous calculations show that an increase in  implies an increase in g
S. Hence, an
exogenous increase in  induces a decrease in q.
Turning to the eects of a change in security  and thus  = =(1   ), rst note that,
since the sign of  is ambiguous, we cannot sign dq=d =  =q. However, we can
sign the eect of an exogenous change in security on arming by both countries. To proceed,
recall that  G =  GE, which implies g































[q( + 1   q) + 2]2  
RE

q2 + (2q   1)







15The second equality below can be veried by using the denitions of  G
E and  G
S (both of which equal
 G
 in equilibrium) given in connection with (A.6) to eliminate RE and RS.






q( + 1   q) + 2
+
RSq[(1   )2q(q + ) + (1    + q2)(1   q)]
[(1   q)(1    + q) + (1   )2]2 > 0:
It follows that dg
E=d < 0. Similar calculations show that dg
S=d < 0. Hence, an increase
in security ( and thus ) unambiguously reduces arming by both countries, as claimed in
part (iii) in the proposition.
Proof of Proposition 3.
Part i: Let Zk  (RE   gE)(RS   gS)1  denote the total surplus under security regime
k (= 1;) and observe that, from Proposition 2(iii), Z < Z1. Focusing on i = E, to prove
the rst point, it is sucient to show that, for any  2 [0;1), lim!0 V 
E > lim!0 V 1
E. This
suciency is so for the following reason. Since, as was noted in the text above, V 
E < V 1
E
for  = 1
2 and equilibrium payos are continuous in , the inequality implies that there
will exist an ~  2 (0; 1
2) such that V 
E = V 1
E for  = ~  and V 
E > V 1
E for all  2 [0; ~ ).
Furthermore, since Zk = V k
E + V k
S and Z < Z1, it follows that V 
S < V 1
S for all  2 [0; ~ ).
By the same logic, we also can establish the existence of an ~ ~  2 (1
2;1) such that V 
S = V 1
S
for  = ~ ~ , with V 
S > V 1
S and V 
E < V 1
E for all  2 (~ ~ ;1].)
To proceed, let bS(gE) and bE(gS) denote the best-response functions of countries S




(1   )gE(gE + RS)   gE)
whereas bE(gS) = RE for gS > 0 and bE(0) equals any gE 2 (0;RE].16 One can verify now























Substituting these values into (7a) with  = 0 yields the following equilibrium welfare value


























16Recalling that   =(1   ), the denition of bS(gE) reveals that bS(gE) > 0 for all gE 2 (0;RS=)




E > 0 for all resource endowments and  2 [0;1). By contrast, from (8a)
with  = 0, lim
!0
V 1






E for  2 [0;1).
Part ii: That V 
E is not necessarily increasing in security () follows from inspection of
the rst part of (A.10), which reveals that, in the neighborhood of  = 0, V 
E could be
decreasing, increasing or non-monotonic in  for   RS
RE+RS:
28